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Executive Compensation and 
the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt 
 
 
PAUL BROCKMAN, XIUMIN MARTIN, and EMRE UNLU* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ 
portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega).  
Large deltas discourage managerial risk-taking, while large vegas encourage risk-taking. 
Theory suggests that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining 
managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation 
between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short-maturity debt. We also find that short-
maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega- and delta-related incentives on bond yields. 
Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short-term debt mitigates agency costs of debt 
arising from compensation risk.   
JEL:  G30; G32 
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The use of stock- and option-based executive compensation has increased dramatically during 
the past few decades. The median exposure of CEO wealth to stock prices tripled between 1980 
and 1994 (Hall and Liebman (1998)), and then doubled again between 1994 and 2000 
(Bergstresser and Philippon (2006)). Such changes in executive compensation have a direct 
impact on the manager’s exposure to risk, thus altering both incentives and behavior. Carpenter 
(2000) and Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) discuss two effects of compensation on 
managerial incentives. One effect is caused by the sensitivity of compensation to stock prices 
(delta). A second effect is caused by the sensitivity of compensation to stock return volatility 
(vega). The higher the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock prices, the weaker will be the 
manager’s appetite for risk (Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002)). In contrast, the higher the 
compensation package’s sensitivity to stock return volatility, the stronger will be the manager’s 
appetite for risk (Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)). By 
altering managerial risk preferences, stock-based compensation also influences third-party (e.g., 
creditors, suppliers, customers) perceptions of those risk preferences. The primary objective of 
this study is to investigate the role of short-term debt in reducing agency costs of debt arising 
from executive incentive contracts. Specifically, we examine the effect of the two portfolio 
sensitivities on the maturity structure of corporate debt. In addition, we analyze the effect of debt 
maturity on the relation between portfolio sensitivities and bond yields. The empirical results 
provide a consistent picture that short-term debt reduces agency costs of debt associated with 
compensation incentives.   
Traditional agency theory posits a conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors. 
In their seminal studies, Fama and Miller (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that 
shareholders have an incentive to expropriate bondholder wealth by substituting into riskier 
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investments, a phenomenon commonly referred to as asset substitution. Equity-based 
compensation provides managers with a potentially stronger motive for asset substitution. 
Creditors understand these risk incentives and rationally price them. For example, credit rating 
agency reports show an awareness of the link between CEO compensation and managerial risk 
appetites.  A 2007 Moody’s Investors Service Special Comment states that “Executive pay is 
incorporated into Moody’s credit analysis of rated issuers because compensation is a determinant 
of management behavior that affects indirectly credit quality (p. 1).” The report later explains 
that the “primary interest in analyzing pay is to gain insight into the compensation committee’s 
intent regarding the structure, size and focus of incentives (p. 4).” Moody’s has also published 
the results of an internal study conducted in 2005 entitled CEO Compensation and Credit Risk. 
This study concludes that “pay packages that are highly sensitive to stock price and/or operating 
performance may induce greater risk taking by managers, perhaps consistent with stockholders’ 
objectives, but not necessarily bondholders’ objectives (p. 8).” We find similar statements 
regarding CEO incentives and credit analysis in Standard & Poor’s reports.1     
Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) argue that shorter-term debt can reduce managerial 
incentives to increase risk.  Further, Leland and Toft (1996) claim that short-term debt can 
reduce or even eliminate agency costs associated with asset substitution. 2  An important insight 
from Stulz (2000) is that short-term debt provides creditors with “an extremely powerful tool to 
monitor management.” Similarly, Rajan and Winton (1995) argue that short-term debt provides 
creditors with additional flexibility to monitor managers with minimum effort.   
Using two measures of risk preference derived from managerial compensation packages 
in this paper, we test the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt arising from 
asset substitution. Specifically, we posit that the proportion of short-term debt increases in CEO 
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compensation risk. One measure of the manager’s appetite for risk is the sensitivity of the 
compensation package to underlying stock prices. Creditors recognize that the lower this 
sensitivity, the more likely the manager is to engage in risk-increasing strategies. We therefore 
expect that the lower the manager’s sensitivity to stock prices, the larger the proportion of short-
term debt in the firm’s capital structure. In contrast, the manager’s appetite for risk increases 
with the sensitivity of the compensation package to stock return volatility. We therefore expect 
that the higher the manager’s sensitivity to stock return volatility, the larger the proportion of 
short-term debt in the firm’s capital structure. Prior studies argue and find some evidence that the 
cost of debt increases in managerial compensation risk (e.g., Daniel, Martin, and Naveen (2004), 
Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), and Shaw (2007)). If short maturities restrain managerial risk-
seeking, then we expect that short-term debt will attenuate the effect of compensation risk on the 
cost of debt.  
We study the causal link between CEO incentive compensation and corporate debt 
maturity using a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations during the 14-year period from 1992 to 
2005. We employ alternative definitions of short-term debt, follow Core and Guay’s (2002) 
method for estimating option sensitivities,3 and apply several empirical methodologies (e.g., 
pooled OLS and GMM simultaneous equation estimation, fixed-effect regressions, and change-
in-variables regressions) and an alternative new debt issuance sample to analyze the predicted 
relations. As hypothesized, we find a negative and significant relation between CEO portfolio 
deltas and short-term debt. Also consistent with expectations, we find a positive and significant 
relation between CEO portfolio vegas and short-term debt. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that short-term debt is used to reduce agency costs associated with high managerial 
compensation risk. Our empirical results are robust to controlling for CEO stock ownership, 
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leverage, asset maturity, growth opportunities, firm size, term structure, bond rating, and other 
issuer characteristics.  
Next, we use a sample of 268,400 bond-day observations for 114 unique firms during the 
1994 to 2005 period to examine whether short-maturity debt mitigates the impact of managerial 
incentives on the cost of debt.  Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Billett, Mauer, and Zhang 
(2009), Daniel, Martin, and Naveen (2004), Shaw (2007)), we find that higher deltas (vegas) 
lead to lower (higher) borrowing costs.  More importantly, we show that short-term debt 
attenuates the negative (positive) relation between bond yields and deltas (vegas).  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature.  First, we provide empirical 
support for theory that argues that short-maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt related to 
asset substitution (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980), Leland and Toft (1996)). Related 
research by Johnson (2003) finds that short-term debt mitigates the debt overhang problem for 
high growth firms. Our paper complements this finding by showing that short-term debt can also 
mitigate asset substitution problems for firms with high CEO compensation risk.   
Our empirical results also add to the literature on the maturity structure of corporate debt. 
Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996), among others, 
find that debt maturity is determined by firm characteristics such as asset maturity, growth 
opportunities, and firm size. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) provide evidence that 
managerial ownership is an additional determinant of corporate debt maturity. Our study extends 
this literature by showing that CEO compensation incentives also affect debt maturity structure.  
Next, we expand our understanding of how managerial compensation characteristics 
impact corporate capital structure. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) document that firms with 
weak managerial incentives avoid high levels of leverage. Novaes and Zingales (1995) show that 
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the optimal level of leverage for shareholders differs from that chosen by entrenched managers. 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005) document that managerial stock ownership inversely 
affects debt maturity. Our study provides new evidence that the two sensitivities of managerial 
compensation affect debt maturity in different ways: the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price 
increases debt maturity, whereas the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility reduces 
debt maturity.  
Finally, our study sheds light on creditors’ assessment of managerial incentives and risk-
seeking behavior. Option-based compensation is designed in part to encourage risk-averse, 
underdiversified managers to invest in positive but risky NPV projects. However, it is an open 
question as to whether option-based compensation might also encourage excessive risk-taking, 
thus aggravating stockholder-debtholder conflicts. John and John (1993) and Parrino and 
Weisbach (1999) find evidence that suggests option-based compensation may increase risk-
taking, whereas Carpenter (2000), Ross (2004), and Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2004) find 
no such relation. Our empirical results confirm that creditors take into consideration the impact 
of option-based compensation on managerial risk-seeking behavior and adjust debt maturity and 
yield spreads accordingly.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we review related research and develop our 
testable hypotheses. Section II discusses the sample and data. We present our empirical findings 
in Section III, and we summarize and conclude in Section IV. 
 
I. Related Research and Hypotheses 
A. Related Research 
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Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that measuring the partial derivative (or, 
sensitivity) of the change in managerial compensation with respect to a change in a performance 
variable is the preferred way to assess managerial incentives. Recent empirical research 
examines the relation between CEO portfolio sensitivities and the firm’s investment decisions. 
Guay (1999) finds that the sensitivity of CEO portfolios to stock return volatility is positively 
related to the firm’s growth opportunities. Similarly, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that 
greater sensitivity of CEO options to stock return volatility is related to greater exploration risk 
and less risk hedging for a sample of oil and gas industry firms. Further, Hanlon, Rajgopal, and 
Shevlin (2004) show that firms with CEO option portfolios that are more sensitive to stock return 
volatility have greater one-year ahead stock return volatility, though such effects are 
economically small. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) endogenize CEO compensation and a 
firm’s financial and investment policies and find that greater sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
return volatility is associated with higher leverage, larger research and development expenditures, 
and less capital expenditures.  Taken together, these findings support the claim that option-based 
sensitivities exert significant influence on managerial decision-making.   
 Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) disentangle the opposing effects of portfolio 
sensitivities on the manager’s appetite for risk.  They argue that the “sensitivity to stock return 
volatility should, ceteris paribus, give the manager an incentive to take more risk” (p. 801), 
while the “sensitivity to stock price should give a risk-averse manager an incentive to avoid risk” 
(p. 802). They find that managers with high portfolio sensitivities to stock return volatility tend 
to hedge less with derivative securities than managers with relatively low sensitivities. This 
finding supports the vega effect of executive compensation. They also show that managers with 
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high portfolio sensitivities to stock prices (i.e., deltas) tend to hedge more with derivative 
securities than managers with low sensitivities.  
There is considerable evidence that creditors understand the effect of price and volatility 
sensitivities on the CEO’s risk-seeking behavior. Billett, Mauer, and Zhang (2009) find that 
when firms announce new CEO stock option grants, stockholders experience positive abnormal 
returns while bondholders experience negative abnormal returns. Bondholder returns are more 
negative with high vega stock option grants and less negative with high delta option grants. 
Daniel, Martin, and Naveen (2004) examine the impact of the CEO’s delta and vega on the 
firm’s cost of capital. They conclude that these CEO incentives affect the firm’s cost of debt 
because “the bond markets understand and account for the effect of incentives on risk-taking” (p. 
5).  
 Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980) argue that “with rational expectations, debt-holders 
recognize the entrepreneur’s incentive problem, and discount debt value accordingly.... In the 
absence of mechanisms which resolve the incentive problem, the entrepreneur incurs the agency 
costs” (p. 1229). The authors note that the risk incentive problem can be solved by shortening 
debt maturity. Lelend and Toft (1996) similarly argue that short-maturity debt reduces or 
eliminates asset substitution agency costs. Short-term debt has also been shown to reduce agency 
costs of managerial discretion by subjecting managers to more frequent monitoring by 
underwriters, investors, and rating agencies (Stulz (2000) and Rajan and Winton (1995)). 
 In this study, we follow Knopf, Nam, and Thornton’s (2002) framework and extend the 
above literature by examining the impact of both dimensions of compensation risk (i.e., vega and 
delta effects) on the firm’s debt maturity.  Similar to Johnson (2003), we argue that short-term 
debt can be used to mitigate bondholder-shareholder conflicts.  However, whereas Johnson 
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examines the underinvestment agency problem caused by growth opportunities, we examine the 
asset substitution agency problem caused by the incentive structure of executive compensation. 
Without the use of short-term debt, managers with high vega (risk-seeking) incentives would 
bear higher agency costs and find it more difficult to access the credit markets. Berlin (2006) 
summarizes this relation between risk and maturity as follows (p. 4): “For some very risky firms, 
lenders are simply unwilling to lend long term because lenders will lose money too often …  As 
a result, lenders will provide only very short-term financing for such firms to keep them on a 
short leash.” Like a short leash, short maturities can mitigate principal-agent problems.  
B. Hypotheses 
Although linking managerial compensation to firm performance by managerial stock and 
option ownership reduces owner-manager conflicts of interest, it may exacerbate owner-creditor 
conflicts. Previous empirical studies suggest that compensation contracts have two opposing 
effects on managerial incentives. The first effect is the sensitivity of the compensation package 
to movements in the underlying stock price. Tying a manager’s wealth to the firm’s stock price 
decreases a risk-averse manager’s appetite for risk. The second effect is the sensitivity of the 
compensation package to stock return volatility. Due to the convex payoff structure of options, 
the value of a manager’s stock option portfolio increases with the volatility of the firm’s stock 
returns. Thus, tying managerial wealth to stock returns increases a risk-averse manager’s appetite 
for risk. 
Previous theoretical research also argues that asset substitution problems can be mitigated 
through the use of short-maturity debt since the value of shorter-term debt is less sensitive to 
shifts from low to high variance projects. Building on these arguments and previous empirical 
evidence, we posit that the maturity structure of debt can be used to mitigate compensation-
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related agency costs of debt for firms with high managerial compensation risk.4 Our first 
hypotheses can be stated as follows:  
H1a: The proportion of short-term debt is negatively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio to stock prices (delta). 
 
H1b: The proportion of short-term debt is positively related to the sensitivity of the CEO’s 
portfolio to stock return volatility (vega). 
 
 Prior studies posit and find evidence of a positive relation between managerial risk 
seeking behavior and the cost of debt (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980), Daniel, Martin, and 
Naveen (2004), Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), and Shaw (2007)). If short-maturity debt 
discourages risk-tolerant managers from shifting towards risky projects and allows creditors to 
monitor managers with less effort, then we expect short-term debt to attenuate the positive 
relation between compensation risk and the cost of debt.  Our second hypothesis can thus be 
stated as follows: 
H2: The proportion of short-term debt reduces the positive (negative) relation between 
vega (delta) and the cost of debt.  
 
 
II. Data and Variables 
A. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 We construct two samples to test our main hypotheses, namely, a debt maturity sample to 
test H1a and H1b, and a bond yield sample to test H2. We draw archival data from various 
sources to construct the debt maturity sample. Specifically, we collect CEO compensation and 
ownership information from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. Financial accounting 
and stock return information come from COMPUSTAT annual files and CRSP monthly files, 
respectively. Yields on long-term government bonds are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank website.5  
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We construct the debt maturity sample (to test H1a and H1b) by identifying the CEO of 
each firm in ExecuComp over the 1992 to 2005 period. We require that all necessary information 
be available to compute the price and volatility sensitivities of the CEO’s option portfolio as well 
as the CEO’s stock ownership. Next, we match the initial sample to COMPUSTAT and CRSP. 
Following prior literature (Barclay and Smith (1995), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005)) 
we restrict our sample to industrial firms with SIC codes from 2000 and 5999.6 To be included in 
the final sample we require that all variables used in the study (discussed in the following 
sections) be available. We delete the few observations for which debt maturity is potentially 
erroneous (less than 0% or greater than 100%). To eliminate the effect of outliers, we winsorize 
all variables at 1% and 99% of each variable’s empirical distribution. Our final sample contains 
6,825 firm-year observations based on 1,312 unique firms. 
To construct our bond yield sample (to test H2), we identify publicly traded bonds of our 
sample firms using the Mergent Fixed Income Securities database. Following previous literature, 
we exclude bond issues with special features (e.g., call, put, sinking fund, convertible, credit 
enhancement, floating-rate coupon).7 We retrieve daily bond yields from Thomson’s Datastream. 
Our sample contains 268,400 bond-day observations based on 266 bond issues from 114 unique 
firms. Our sample covers the fiscal years 1994 to 2005.8  
B. Variable Descriptions 
B.1. Debt Maturity Regression 
B.1.1. Dependent Variables: Debt Maturity Structure 
 We use two measures for debt maturity structure. Our first variable, ST3, measures the 
proportion of total debt maturing in three years or less. Alternatively, we measure the maturity 
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structure of debt as the proportion of debt maturing in five years or less (denoted by ST5).9 These 
two measures are consistent with prior literature.10  
B.1.2. Treatment Variables: CEO Portfolio Sensitivities 
 We define the CEO’s portfolio price sensitivity (PRCSEN) as the change in the value of 
the CEO’s stock and option portfolio in response to a 1% increase in the price of the firm’s 
common stock. Volatility sensitivity (VOLSEN) is similarly defined as the change in the value of 
the CEO’s option portfolio due to a 1% increase in the annualized standard deviation of the 
firm’s stock return.11 Partial derivatives of the option price with respect to stock price (delta) and 
stock return volatility (vega) are based on the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model 
adjusted for dividends by Merton (1973). We follow Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) in 
calculating vega and delta, consistent with recent papers including Yermack (1995), Hall and 
Liebman (1998), Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), Core and Guay (2002), Guay (1999), Cohen, 
Hall, and Viceira (2000), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005), and Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002). We discuss the derivation of delta and vega in more detail in Appendix A. 
B.1.3. Control Variables 
 We choose the control variables based on previous debt maturity literature. Earlier 
studies analyze the relation between debt maturity and firm size (LSIZE – in logs), the square of 
firm size (LSIZE2), leverage (LEVERAGE), asset maturity (ASSET_MAT), managerial ownership 
(OWN), market-to-book (M/B), term structure of interest rates (TERM), abnormal earnings 
(ABNEARN), asset return standard deviations (STD_DEV), and dummy variables for firms with 
S&P credit ratings (RATE_DUM), firms with a high Altman (1977) Z-score (ZSCORE_DUM), 
and firms from regulated industries (REG_DUM). We provide more detailed definitions and data 
sources for all variables in the maturity regression in Appendix B. We also provide motivations 
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for each of the right-hand-side variables in a supplemental Internet Appendix, available online at 
the Journal of Finance website (http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp).  
B.1.4. Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics 
We estimate the maturity regression based on the debt maturity sample. We present the 
debt maturity sample distribution in Table I. The full sample includes 6,825 observations over 
the 1992 to 2005 period. Panel A presents the time series distribution of ST3 (proportion of total 
debt maturing in three years or less), ST5 (proportion of total debt maturing in five years or less), 
LEVERAGE (long-term debt divided by total assets), PRCSEN (change in value of CEO’s 
portfolio due to a 1% increase in stock price), and VOLSEN (change in value of CEO’s portfolio 
due to a 1% increase in stock return volatility); Panel B presents the cross-sectional distributions 
of the same variables by industry. The industry breakdown is based on two-digit SIC codes.  
[Insert Table I] 
Our debt maturity measures (including ST3 and ST5) and LEVERAGE have remained 
relatively stable over the course of our sample period (Panel A). There is an upward trend in the 
use of short-term debt from 1992 until 2000, followed by a general decline. Both ST3 and ST5 
reach their highest median values of 43.2% and 66.6%, respectively, at the top of the bull market 
in 2000. ST3 obtains its lowest median value of 28.5% in 2005, while ST5 obtains its lowest 
median value of 46.6% in 1992.  
In contrast to the gradual rise and fall of short-term debt usage over our sample period, 
CEO sensitivities display a strong secular trend. The median sensitivity of CEO portfolios to a 
1% increase in stock price (PRCSEN) increases from 1.111 in 1992 to 2.960 in 2005. This result 
suggests that compensation committees have strengthened the connection between CEO wealth 
and shareholder value.  As described in our hypothesis development section, an increase in 
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PRCSEN is expected to reduce the CEO’s appetite for risk (all else equal). The median 
sensitivity of CEO portfolios to a 1% increase in stock return volatility (VOLSEN) rises from 
0.109 in 1992 to 0.748 in 2005. An increase in VOLSEN is expected to increase the CEO’s 
appetite for risk (all else equal), exacerbating conflicts of interest between owners and creditors. 
Panel B exhibits the cross-sectional variation (by industry) in short-term debt usage and 
portfolio sensitivities. The number of firms in each industry ranges from a low of five (tobacco 
products industry) to a high of 883 (electric, gas, and sanitary services industry). There is 
considerable variation in the use of short-term debt across these industrial categories.  
 In Table II, we present summary statistics for our dependent and right-hand-side 
variables in the maturity regression. The dependent variable ST3 has a mean value of 39.8%, 
which is similar to the reported mean of 40% in Table 1 of Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman 
(2005). The second dependent variable, ST5, has a mean value of 58.3%. Turning to the 
treatment variables, PRCSEN has a mean of 6.914 and VOLSEN has a mean of 1.108. Because 
the distributions of PRCSEN and VOLSEN are right-skewed, we use natural logarithm 
transformations in our empirical tests.12 The statistics for both treatment variables are similar to 
those reported in Table 1 of Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The summary statistics for our 
control variables are consistent with those reported in Johnson (2003), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Raman (2005), and Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), among others.  
[Insert Table II] 
B.2. Cost of Debt Regression 
B.2.1. Dependent Variable: Cost of Debt 
In our cost of debt regression, we use the yield spread (SPREAD) measured as the daily 
difference between the corporate bond’s daily yield-to-maturity and the linearly interpolated 
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benchmark Treasury bond yield (BENCHMARK_TREAS) as our dependent variable. Benchmark 
Treasury yields are based on 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30-year constant maturity series.13  
B.2.2. Treatment and Control Variables 
Our main variables of interest are the interaction terms between managerial incentives 
(LPRCSEN and LVOLSEN) and maturity (LMAT). We define LMAT as the natural logarithm of 
the bond’s maturity, in years. We match the previous fiscal year’s information for all treatment 
and control variables with current bond spreads to ensure that the CEO’s portfolio sensitivities 
(as well as the accounting information) are known by the bond market at the time that borrowing 
costs are determined.  
We also control for several variables that have been shown by previous literature to 
influence yield spreads at both the firm level and the aggregate level. Specifically, we control for 
stock volatility (STD_RET), stock return (AVG_RET), bond rating (RATING), profitability (ROS, 
or return on sales), leverage (LEVERAGE), interest coverage (INTCOVERAGE), coupon rate 
(COUPON), bond illiquidity (ILLIQUIDITY), bond issue size (ISSUE_SIZE), Treasury rate 
(BENCHMARK_TREAS), yield curve slope (YLDCRV_SLOPE), and the Eurodollar-Treasury 
spread (EURO_TREAS_SPREAD).  We provide more detailed definitions and data sources for all 
variables in the cost of debt regression in Appendix B, and we discuss the motivation for each of 
the right-hand-side variables in the supplemental Internet Appendix.  
B.2.3. Sample Distribution and Summary Statistics 
Table III reports summary statistics for the variables used in the cost of debt regression 
based on the bond yield sample.  Panel A shows generally increasing yield spreads across each 
risk category, moving from AAA-rated bonds in the far left column to CCC-rated bonds in the 
far right column.14 We find monotonically increasing yield spreads within each risk category, 
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moving from short-term to long-term maturities. In Panel B, we present means and standard 
deviations, as well as variable values at the minimum, maximum, 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th 
percentiles. We find considerable variation for the dependent variable, SPREAD, as well as for 
the independent variables. Bond maturity (MAT), for example, ranges from 7.718 years at the 
25th percentile to 21.182 years at the 75th percentile.            
[Insert Table III] 
III. Estimation Methods and Empirical Results 
A. Debt Maturity Regression 
A.1. Pooled Cross-Sectional, Time-Series Analysis 
 We estimate the following pooled cross-sectional, times-series regression using the debt 
maturity sample as follows: 
ST3i,t (ST5i,t) = α0 + α1LPRCSENi,t + α2LVOLSENi,t + α3LSIZEi,t + α4LSIZE2i,t +  
                         α5LEVERAGEi,t + α6ASSET_MATi,t + α7OWNi,t + α8M/Bi,t + α9TERMi,t   +                    (1) 
                         α10REG_DUMi,t+ α11ABNEARNi,t+ α12STD_RETi,t + α13RATE_DUMi,t+  
            α14ZSCORE_DUMi,t + εi,t   , 
where all variables are defined in Appendix B. 
In Table IV, we report the empirical results from pooled regression model (1). We use 
Rogers (1993) industry-year clustered standard errors in assessing statistical significance. 
According to hypothesis H1a, we expect a negative relation between the use of short-term debt 
(ST3) and the CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to stock prices (LPRCSEN). Our regression results 
support this hypothesis by showing that LPRCSEN’s estimated coefficient (-0.0385) is negative 
and highly significant. According to H1b, we expect a positive relation between the use of short-
term debt (ST3) and the CEO’s portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility (LVOLSEN). Again, 
the regression results support this hypothesis by showing that LVOLSEN’s estimated coefficient 
(0.0309) is positive and highly significant.  
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[Insert Table IV] 
Using ST5 as the dependent variable, we find that the estimated coefficient on LPRCSEN 
(-0.0179) is negative and significant. This finding suggests that longer-term maturities are more 
likely to be chosen when managers’ incentives are aligned with creditors. We also find that the 
estimated coefficient on LVOLSEN (0.0277) is positive and significant.  
Following Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005), we also estimate a firm fixed-effects 
model. The results, which are reported in the supplemental Internet Appendix,15 are similar to 
those reported in Table IV. Specifically, the LPRCSEN coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant, and the LVOLSEN coefficients are positive and statistically significant. Taken 
together, the evidence shows that when the ex ante incentive of managers to substitute risky 
assets for safe assets is high (i.e., high portfolio vegas), short maturity debt is more likely to be 
chosen to mitigate bondholder-shareholder agency conflicts.16    
Besides the main variables of interest, LPRCSEN and LVOLSEN, our Table IV pooled 
regressions also yield consistent results for the control variables.  Most of the control variables 
are statistically significant and display the expected sign based on previous studies (e.g., Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005)). Specifically, the estimated coefficients on LSIZE, 
LEVERAGE, ASSET_MAT, REG_DUM (ST5 regression only), RATE_DUM, and 
ZSCORE_DUM are negative and statistically significant, consistent with expectations and 
previous findings. The estimated coefficients on LSIZE2, OWN, and STD_RET (ST5 regression 
only) are positive and significant, also consistent with expectations and previous findings. We 
obtain insignificant results for M/B, TERM, REG_DUM (ST3 regression only), ABNEARN, and 
STD_RET (ST3 regression only). Overall, our pooled regression results explain between 22.6% 
and 25.1% of the variation in short-term debt.  
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We also evaluate the economic significance of our findings. Our Table IV slope estimates 
on LPRCSEN and LVOLSEN are -0.0385 and 0.0309, respectively. When price sensitivity 
changes from the 50th percentile to the 95th percentile, the firm’s use of short-term debt (ST3) 
decreases by 8.7%. Thus, for a firm with roughly 40% of its total debt in short-term maturities 
(the sample mean in Table II), a change in LPRCSEN from the 50th to the 95th percentile would 
reduce this firm’s short-term component from 40% to 31.3% of total firm debt. The same 
computation for LVOLSEN shows an increase of 4.4% in the firm’s use of short-term debt (ST3), 
implying an increase in the short-term component from 40% to 44.4% of total firm debt.17 We 
conclude that there is an economically significant relation between portfolio sensitivities and the 
maturity structure of corporate debt.   
A.2. Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation 
 
 If debt maturity and leverage are jointly determined, then ordinary least squares 
estimation can lead to a biased leverage coefficient. To address this concern, in this section we 
estimate a system that models leverage and debt maturity as jointly endogenous. Our two-
equation system is specified as follows:     
LEVERAGEi,t = β0 + β1ST3i,t (ST5i,t) + β2LPRCSENi,t + β3LVOLSENi,t + β4LSIZEi,t +  
            β5OWNi,t + β6M/Bi,t + β7REG_DUMi,t + β8ABNEARNi,t + β9STD_RETi,t +            (2) 
                          β10FIX_ASSETi,t +  β11ROAi,t + β12NOL_DUMi,t + β13ITC_DUMi,t + ζi,t  
             
ST3i,t (ST5i,t) = α0 + α1LPRCSENi,t + α2LVOLSENi,t + α3LSIZEi,t + α4LSIZE2i,t +  
                      α5LEVERAGEi,t + α6ASSET_MATi,t + α7OWNi,t + α8M/Bi,t + α9TERMi,t   +                            (3)         
                      α10REG_DUMi,t + α11ABNEARNi,t + α12STD_RETi,t + α13RATE_DUMi,t + 
         α14ZSCORE_DUMi,t + εi,t  , 
where dependent and right-hand-side variables are as defined in Appendix B. 
We rely on earlier theoretical studies to guide our selection of right-hand-side variables in 
our simultaneous equations.  Theoretical capital structure studies show that the fixed asset ratio 
(FIX_ASSET), profitability measure (ROA), and expected marginal tax rate (NOL_DUM and 
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ITC_DUM) are important determinants of leverage (see Johnson (2003), Barclay, Marx, and 
Smith (2003)).  In contrast, theoretical debt maturity studies do not find that fixed asset ratios 
(when asset maturity is controlled for), profitability measures, or the expected marginal tax rate 
are important determinants of maturity.  We therefore assume that these variables are orthogonal 
to the error term and restrict their coefficients to be zero in the maturity equation.18 Further, 
theoretical capital structure studies make no claims about the square of firm size (LSIZE2), asset 
maturity (ASSET_MAT), term structure (TERM), the rated-firm dummy (RATE_DUM), or 
financial distress (ZSCORE_DUM). 19  We therefore treat these variables as orthogonal to the 
error term and restrict their coefficients to be zero in the leverage equation. 20 
Table V reports the empirical results for the maturity equation (3). The results support 
our H1a, with a negative (-0.0829) and significant coefficient on LPRCSEN.  The empirical 
results also support our H1b, with a positive (0.0984) and significant coefficient on LVOLSEN.  
We obtain similar results when we extend our definition of short-term debt from three years to 
five years. Using ST5 as the dependent variable, we find a negative (-0.0698) and significant 
coefficient on LPRCSEN, and a positive (0.1269) and significant coefficient on LVOLSEN. 
Overall, these GMM results confirm the earlier pooled regression results and show that debt 
maturity structure can reduce the agency costs of debt.21  
[Insert Table V] 
A.3. Change-in-Variables Analysis 
 We investigate the robustness of the results above with respect to variable changes, as 
opposed to variable levels.22 We estimate the following pooled regression using 5,513 firm-year 
observations:           
ΔST3i,t (ΔST5i,t) = α0 + α1ΔLPRCSENi,t + α2ΔLVOLSENi,t + α3ΔLSIZEi,t + α4ΔLSIZE2i,t +  
    α5ΔLEVERAGEi,t + α6ΔASSET_MATi,t + α7ΔOWNi,t + α8ΔM/Bi,t + α9ΔTERMi,t +                (4) 
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    α10ΔABNEARNi,t  +  α11ΔSTD_RETi,t  + α12ΔRATE_DUMi,t + α13ΔZSCORE_DUMi,t + εi,t  , 
 
where all variables are as defined previously. Taking first differences (Δ) reduces our sample 
size from 6,825 to 5,513 observations. We use the variable’s value at t-2 if the value at t-1 is 
missing. We also eliminate REG_DUM from the change-in-variables specification since it does 
not change for any firm in our sample. The remaining right-hand-side variables (after taking first 
differences) are described in Appendix B.   
In Table VI, we report the empirical results from pooled regression model (4). The results 
support our H1a with a negative (-0.0440) and significant coefficient on ΔLPRCSEN; the results 
also support our H1b by finding a positive (0.0483) and significant coefficient for ΔLVOLSEN.  
We obtain similar results for changes in short-term debt with maturities up to five years. Using 
ΔST5 as the dependent variable, we find a negative (positive) and significant coefficient on 
ΔLPRCSEN (ΔLVOLSEN). Overall, these change-in-variables results confirm the earlier findings 
based on variable levels. 
[Insert Table VI] 
A.4. Managerial Incentives, Investment Policy, and Capital Structure 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) argue that it is important to disentangle the effects of 
managerial compensation incentives on the firm’s investment and financing policies from the 
effects of these policies (and the corresponding risk profile of the firm’s assets) on managerial 
compensation incentives. Accordingly, we follow Coles, Daniel, and Naveen’s (2006) 
framework and examine the relations among a firm’s managerial incentives (LPRCSEN and 
LVOLSEN), financial policies (ST3, ST5, and LEVERAGE), and investment policies (i.e., 
research and development expenditures (RD) and net capital expenditures (CAPEX)).  
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 In Panel A of Table VII, we report our results for the dependent variables ST3, LPRCSEN, 
LVOLSEN, LEVERAGE, RD, CAPEX based on GMM estimation. In Panel B, we use the 
alternative definition for short-term debt, ST5, in place of ST3. Our right-hand-side variables 
include the variables described above and in Appendix B, augmented by additional variables 
motivated by prior literature (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)).23 The additional right-
hand-side variables include the following: LTENURE, the logarithmic transformation of the 
CEO’s tenure measured in years; SURCASH, the cash from assets-in-place; EQUITY_RISK, the 
logarithmic transformation of monthly stock return variance during the fiscal year; CASHCOMP, 
the sum of the CEO’s salary and bonus (in 100 thousands); SGR, the sales growth rate; and 
STOCKRET, the buy-and-hold return during the fiscal year.  We provide more detailed 
definitions and data sources in Appendix B.  
 As Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) note, it becomes increasingly difficult to find 
identifying independent variables for increasing numbers of structural equations.  In spite of this 
difficulty, we continue to follow previous theoretical studies to guide our choice of structural 
restrictions and help identify our six-equation system.  Previous theory shows that firm size and 
the investment opportunity set are important determinants of a firm’s financial, investment, and 
compensation policies. We therefore view firm size (LSIZE) and market-to-book (M/B) as 
exogenous or pre-determined and include them in all six equations. To the best of our knowledge, 
previous theory does not posit significant relations between our other instruments (in the debt 
maturity and leverage regressions) and compensation incentives (LPRCSEN and LVOLSEN) or 
investment policies (RD and CAPEX). We therefore treat these variables as orthogonal to the 
error terms in the compensation and investment equations. We note, however, that if these 
assumptions are violated, then our estimation procedure can lead to biased estimates. 
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 The results in the first column of Panel A support our main hypotheses.24 We find that the 
estimated coefficient on LPRCSEN is negative (-0.1560) and significant, and the estimated 
coefficient on LVOLSEN is positive (0.1904) and significant. In column 4, we examine the 
relation between managerial incentives and financing policies. We find that the manager’s use of 
leverage is negatively (-0.3495) related to delta and positively (0.0720) related to vega.  Both 
coefficients are significant. These findings are consistent with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), 
who show that managers with high vega seek risky financing policies. The results in column 4 
also show that the relation between short-term debt and leverage is negative (-0.3495) and 
significant. 
In columns 5 and 6, we examine the relation between managerial incentives and investing 
policies. We focus on the vega dimension of managerial incentives since Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006) hypothesize a positive (negative) relation between LVOLSEN and RD (CAPEX); 
in contrast, their predictions on LPRCSEN and RD (CAPEX) are ambiguous. All else equal, 
higher LVOLSEN should encourage high risk investments in R&D expenditures and discourage 
low-risk investments in fixed-asset capital expenditures. Our results support these hypotheses. 
Estimated coefficients on LVOLSEN are positive (0.0393) and significant in the RD equation, 
and negative (-0.0462) and significant in the CAPEX equation. More importantly, the results in 
Panel A suggest that even after controlling for the simultaneity between managerial 
compensation incentives and a firm’s investment and financing policies, our main results 
continue to hold: short-maturity debt increases in vega but decreases in delta.25,26      
[Insert Table VII] 
A.5. New Debt Issues 
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Our previous results focus on the relation between CEO portfolio sensitivities and current 
maturity structures of debt. In this section, we examine the relation between portfolio 
sensitivities and the maturity of new debt issues – an incremental approach.27 This setting allows 
us to take the perspective of a prospective creditor who analyzes the firm characteristics that will 
determine the maturity structure of new lending. Consistent with our central hypothesis, we 
expect that short-maturity debt is more (less) likely to be used when LVOLSEN (LPRCSEN) is 
high.  
 We obtain the maturity structure of new debt issues from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC). Our sample includes 7,388 issues representing 873 unique firms over the period 1992 to 
2005.28 We also construct two alternative samples that consolidate the original sample into a 
firm-year format by treating multiple issues throughout the year as a single issue. In the first 
consolidated sample, maturity is computed using an issue size-weighted average maturity for 
firms with multiple issues; in the second consolidated sample, maturity is computed using an 
equal-weighted average maturity for firms with multiple issues. The consolidated samples 
include 3,122 firm-year observations.   
We present pooled regression results for each of our three samples in Table VIII.  For the 
unconsolidated sample, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the maturity of the new 
debt issues (LMAT). In the consolidated samples, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
of the issue size-weighted maturity, LWEIGHT_AVG_MAT, or the natural logarithm of the 
equal-weighted maturity, LAVG_MAT. As hypothesized, the estimated coefficients on LPRCSEN 
are positive and significant across all three regressions, and the estimated coefficients on 
LVOLSEN are negative and significant across all three regressions. Similar to previous results, 
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we find that the CEO’s portfolio sensitivities influence the maturity choice of new debt issues. 
The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with prior literature. 
[Insert Table VIII] 
 
B. Cost of Debt Regression 
We test H2 by estimating the following system of simultaneous equations, which allows 
for the joint determination of yield spreads and debt maturity:29  
SPREADi,j,t,d = β0 + β1LMATi,j,t,d + β2LPRCSENi,t-1 + β3LVOLSENi,t-1 + 
                         ( β4LPRCSENi,t-1xLMATi,j,t,d + β5LVOLSENi,t-1xLMATi,j,t,d) + 
                         β6STD_RETi,t,d-1 + β7AVG_RETi,t,d-1 + β8RATINGi,j,t,d-1 + β9ROSi,t-1 + 
                         β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 + β11INTCOVERAGEi,t-1 + β12COUPONi,j +  
                         β13ILLIQUIDITYi,j,t,d-1 + β14ISSUE_SIZEi,j + β15BENCHMARK_TREASi,j,t,d +                     (5) 
                         β16YLDCRV_SLOPEt,d +  β17EURO_TREAS_SPREADt,d + issuer fixed effects + ζi,j,t,d 
 
LMATi,j,t,d = α0 + α1SPREADi,j,t,d + α2LPRCSENi,t-1 + α3LVOLSENi,t-1 + α4STD_RETi,t,d-1 + 
          α5LEVERAGEi,t-1 + α6YLDCRV_SLOPEt,d + α7LSIZEi,t-1 + α8LSIZE2i,t-1 +  
          α9ASSET_MATi,t-1 + α10OWNi,t-1 + α11M/Bi,t-1 + α12ABNEARNi,t-1+                                         (6) 
          α12ZSCORE_DUMi,t-1 + issuer fixed effects + εi,j,t,d  , 
where i, j, t, and d denote the ith firm and jth bond for year t and day d. 30 Our main variables of 
interest are the interaction terms LPRCSEN x LMAT and LVOLSEN x LMAT.  All other variables 
are as defined in Appendix B. 
Since an endogenous variable (LMAT) is interacted with portfolio sensitivities we use 
nonlinear GMM.31  Under H2, we expect β4 to be negative and β5 to be positive. Prior literature 
documents a positive relation between managerial compensation risk and the cost of debt. We 
therefore expect β2 to be negative and β3 to be positive. The coefficient β1 captures the maturity 
premium (i.e., the premium required by creditors for a unit increase in the bond’s maturity) and 
is expected to be positive.32  
 We report our simultaneous equation results in Table IX based on the bond yield 
sample.33 In the spread equation (system 1), the coefficient on LPRCSEN (-0.1790) is negative 
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and significant and the coefficient on LVOLSEN (0.2209) is positive and significant. Both results 
are consistent with prior studies suggesting that creditors understand the risk incentives 
imbedded in managerial compensation and rationally price these risks (Daniel, Martin, and 
Naveen (2004), Billet, King, and Mauer (2007), and Shaw (2007)).34 In system 2, we include two 
interaction terms on LVOLSEN and LPRCSEN with LMAT. Consistent with H2, we find that the 
coefficient on LVOLSEN x LMAT (0.7847) is positive and significant, and the coefficient on 
LPRCSEN x LMAT (-1.0830) is negative and significant, suggesting that short-term debt reduces 
agency cost of debt arising from managerial compensation incentives. In the maturity regression 
of both systems, we find a positive and significant coefficient on LPRCSEN and a negative and 
significant coefficient on LVOLSEN. Both of these results are consistent with the evidence 
reported in Tables IV to VIII.  
The combined results in Table IX lead to the conclusion that short-term debt mitigates 
agency costs of debt arising from managerial compensation incentives. At the same time, the 
results also indicate that some firms with high compensation risk still use longer-term debt, and 
consequently they incur a higher cost of debt. Although creditors attempt to steer risk-tolerant 
managers towards short-term debt, creditors are also willing to issue longer-term debt to risk-
tolerant managers for a commensurate risk premium. Some risk-tolerant managers are willing to 
incur the risk premium associated with longer-term debt for reasons such as liquidity risk. For 
example, Diamond (1991, 1993) and Sharpe (1991) argue that too much short-maturity debt 
creates additional risks of suboptimal liquidation. This liquidity (or rollover) risk increases 
expected bankruptcy costs and reduces equity value. In addition, Leland and Toft (1996) argue 
that short-term debt can reduce managers’ ability to pursue risky investments, and the reduction 
in such behavior can decrease the option value of managerial compensation.     
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[Insert Table IX] 
Our Table IX results also allow us to show how changes in debt maturity affect the partial 
derivative of credit spreads with respect to LVOLSEN and LPRCSEN.  Using our system 2 results, 
these two partial derivatives are as follows: 
 = –1.7985 + 0.7847 x LMAT            (7)  
 =   2.5596 – 1.0830 x LMAT .            (8)  
When equation (7) is evaluated at the median LMAT level of 2.722, or 15.2 years, a one-unit 
increase in LVOLSEN raises credit spreads by 0.3375%. However, when equation (7) is 
evaluated at LMAT’s 95th percentile of 3.257, or roughly 26 years, then the LVOLSEN effect on 
credit spreads increases to 0.7573%. This economically significant difference in yield spread 
sensitivity to LVOLSEN between short- and long-term maturities clearly shows that short-term 
debt mitigates the agency costs of vega-related incentives. 
 Similarly, when equation (8) is evaluated at the median LMAT level, we find that a one-
unit increase in LPRCSEN reduces credit spreads by 0.3883%, and when equation (8) is 
evaluated at LMAT’s 95th percentile, a one-unit increase in LPRCSEN reduces credit spreads by 
0.9677%. Overall, these results confirm that the maturity structure of corporate debt plays an 
economically significant role in reducing compensation-related agency costs of debt. 
 In summary, credit yield premiums are disproportionately lower at short-term maturities 
for CEOs with risk-seeking compensation packages (i.e., high vega/low delta portfolios). As a 
result, such firms are more likely to borrow at short-term maturities. This finding is consistent 
with Berlin’s (2006) observation that because financing costs can be prohibitively high for some 
risky firms, their only viable access to funding lies with short-term debt.   
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IV. Conclusion 
Managerial stock and option compensation exerts two opposing forces on managerial 
risk-seeking behavior. One effect arises from the sensitivity of the manager’s portfolio to stock 
prices (delta), and the other effect arises from the sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). All 
else equal, higher sensitivity of the manager’s compensation package to stock prices will 
discourage risk-taking behavior whereas higher sensitivity of the manager’s compensation 
package to stock return volatility will encourage risk-taking behavior (Knopf, Nam, and 
Thornton (2002)). Creditors understand these incentives and rationally price the compensation-
induced risks. Prior research suggests that short-term debt can reduce agency costs associated 
with asset substitution and improve the efficiency of monitoring by lenders.  In this paper, we 
analyze the role of short-term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt arising from CEO portfolio 
sensitivities. Our first hypothesis is that short-term debt is positively related to the sensitivity of 
the CEO’s portfolio to stock return volatility (vega), and negatively related to the sensitivity of 
the CEO’s portfolio to stock prices (delta).  Our second hypothesis is that the use of short-term 
debt reduces the positive (negative) relation between vega (delta) and the cost of debt.   
To test the first hypothesis, we construct a sample of 6,825 firm-year observations during 
the 14-year period from 1992 to 2005, use alternative definitions of short-term debt, implement 
Core and Guay’s (2002) method for estimating option sensitivities, and employ several 
econometric techniques to analyze the predicted relations. We find a consistently negative and 
statistically significant relation between the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock prices 
and short-term debt. We also find a consistently positive and statistically significant relation 
between the compensation package’s sensitivity to stock return volatility and short-term debt. 
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Our empirical findings are robust to controls for numerous factors that have been shown to affect 
debt maturity. To further mitigate endogeneity concerns, we re-test our main hypotheses using a 
sample of new debt issues.  Our results confirm that creditors are more (less) likely to lend short-
term funds when CEOs have high vega (high delta) incentive packages.   
We also examine the relation between managerial incentives, short-maturity debt, and 
corporate bond yields. Consistent with prior literature, we find that bond yields are increasing in 
vega and decreasing in delta. More importantly, we analyze the interaction between maturity 
structure and managerial incentives on bond yields. We show that short-maturity debt attenuates 
the impact of vega on bond yields while it reinforces the impact of delta on bond yields. These 
results suggest that short-maturity debt constrains managerial risk preferences and mitigates asset 
substitution problems.  
Overall, this study extends the literature in several areas, including executive 
compensation, agency costs of debt, and the determinants of debt maturity. We provide new 
evidence that the two portfolio sensitivities in managerial compensation affect corporate debt 
maturity, and that they do so in quite different ways.  Our results add to the literature on the 
determinants of debt maturity by showing that executive portfolio deltas and vegas are 
significant determinants, both statistically and economically. Our study also sheds light on the 
creditor’s assessment of the causal connections between executive compensation and risk-
seeking behavior on the one hand, and between risk-seeking behavior and agency costs of debt 
on the other hand. Perhaps most importantly, our empirical results highlight the role of short-
term debt in mitigating agency costs of debt.   
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Appendix A:  Computation of Portfolio Sensitivities 
We define the CEO’s portfolio price sensitivity (PRCSEN) as the change in the value of 
the CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to a 1% increase in the price of the firm’s common 
stock. Volatility sensitivity (VOLSEN) is defined as the change in the value of the CEO’s option 
portfolio due to a 1% change in the annualized standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns.35 
Partial derivatives of the option price with respect to stock price (delta) and stock return 
volatility (vega) are based on the Black-Scholes (1973) option-pricing model adjusted for 
dividends by Merton (1973) as follows: 
,
 
 
where N is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution; N’ is the density 
function for the normal distribution; S is the price of the underlying stock; X is the exercise price 
of the option; σ is the expected stock return volatility over the life of the option; r is the natural 
logarithm of the risk-free interest rate; T is the time to maturity of the option in years; and d is 
the natural logarithm of the expected dividend yield over the life of the option. 
 The six variables necessary to compute the delta and vega of an option are the exercise 
price, time to maturity, volatility, risk-free rate, dividend yield, and stock price. All of these input 
variables are either directly observable or can be accurately estimated.36 Because details on the 
exercise prices and maturities of CEO options are not fully disclosed in annual statements, we 
follow Core and Guay’s (2002) approximation method.37 They show that their method explains 
99% of the actual variation in option portfolio values and sensitivities.  
  We partition the CEO’s option portfolio into three parts: (1) options from new grants, (2) 
exercisable options from previous grants, and (3) non-exercisable options from previous grants. 
ExecuComp provides full information on exercise prices (item EXPRIC in ExecuComp) and 
times to maturity for new grants (item EXDATE in ExecuComp ), which makes the computation 
of option delta and vega fairly straightforward. However, for previously granted options, no data 
are available on exercise prices and times to maturity. To estimate the average exercise price for 
previously granted options, we use the “realizable values” as in Core and Guay (2002). The 
realizable value is the immediate exercise value of the CEO’s options. We divide the realizable 
value of previously granted options by the number of options to find how much, on average, the 
stock price is above the exercise price.38 Subtracting this figure from the stock price yields the 
exercise price. 
We follow Core and Guay (2002) when estimating times to maturity for previously 
granted options (unexercisable and exercisable). First, we assume that the time to maturity of an 
unexercisable option is one year less than that of a new grant. This assumption is consistent with 
evidence in Kole (1997) that vesting periods are narrowly bounded between 20 and 28 months, 
with an average of 24 months. Second, we assume that the time to maturity of an exercisable 
option is three years less than that of an unexercisable option.39 Consequently, we set the 
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maturity of an unexercisable (exercisable) option to the new grant’s maturity minus one (four). If 
no options are granted in the current year, we set the time to maturity of an exercisable 
(unexercisable) option to six (nine) years.40 Once the delta (Δ) and vega (ν) of each option 
partition are determined, we calculate PRCSEN and VOLSEN as follows: 
 ,                              (A.1) 
where S and N. denote the stock price and the number of options/stocks in hundreds of  
thousands. The subscripts NG, PGEX, PGUNEX, and STOCK stand for new grants, previously-
granted exercisable options, previously granted non-exercisable options, and stock holdings, 
respectively.  
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Appendix B:  Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable                  Definition and Data Source 
ABNEARN (Earnings in year t+1 (Item#20) – earnings in year t)/(share 
price (Item#199) x outstanding shares (Item#54) in year t). Data 
source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
ASSET_MAT Book value-weighted average of the maturities of property plant 
and equipment and current assets, computed as (gross property, 
plant, and equipment (Item #7)/total assets (Item #6)) * (gross 
property, plant, and equipment (Item #7) /depreciation expense 
(Item #14)) + (current assets (Item #4)/total assets (Item #6)) * 
(current assets (Item #4)/cost of goods sold (Item #41)). Data 
source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
AVG_RET Average of daily stock returns over the preceding 180 days. 
Data source: CRSP daily file. 
BENCHMARK_TREAS  Treasury rate that corresponds most closely to the specific 
bond’s maturity. Data source: FRED at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. 
CAPEX  Net capital expenditures (Item #128 – Item #107) scaled by 
assets (Item #6). Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
CASHCOMP  Sum of the CEO’s salary and bonus (in 100 thousands). Data 
source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
COUPON Coupon rate of specified bond. Data source: Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities Database. 
EQUITY_RISK Logarithmic transformation of monthly stock return variance 
during the fiscal year. Data source: CRSP daily file. 
EURO_TREAS_SPREAD Difference between three-month Eurodollar yields and Treasury 
rates. Data source: Eurodollar yields are from Thomson’s 
Datastream database and Treasury rates are from FRED at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
FIX_ASSET Ratio of net property, plant, and equipment (Item #8) to total 
assets (Item #6). Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
ILLIQUIDITY Proportion of days with zero bond returns over the preceding 
180 days. Data source: Thomson’s Datastream database. 
INTCOVERAGE Logarithmic transformation of pre-tax interest coverage ratio 
(ln(1+[Item #178 + Item #15]/Item #15)). Data source: 
Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
ISSUE_SIZE Natural logarithm of the face value of the bond (in $millions). 
Data source: Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database. 
ITC_DUM Equals one if the firm has an investment tax credit (Item #51), 
and zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial 
file. 
LAVG_MAT  Natural logarithm of the equal-weighted maturity. Data source: 
Thomson’s SDC database. 
LEVERAGE  Long-term debt (Item #9) divided by the market value of the 
firm. Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
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LMAT  Natural logarithm of the bond’s maturity, in years. Data source: 
Thomson’s SDC database (Table VIII) and Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities Database (Table IX). 
LSIZE Market value of equity (Item #199 * Item #54) plus the book 
value of total assets (Item #6) minus the book value of equity 
(Item #60), in logs. Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial 
file. 
LSIZE2 Square of LSIZE. 
LTENURE  Logarithmic transformation of the CEO’s tenure measured in 
years. Data source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
LWEIGHT_AVG_MAT Natural logarithm of the issue size-weighted maturity. Data 
source: Thomson’s SDC database. 
M/B Market value of the firm (Item #199 * Item #54 + Item #6 – 
Item #60) divided by the book value of total assets (Item #6). 
Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
NOL_DUM Equals one if the firm has operating loss carryforwards (Item 
#52), and zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat Annual 
Industrial file. 
OWN Number of shares owned by the CEO (SHROWN in 
ExecuComp) scaled by total shares outstanding (SHRSOUT in 
ExecuComp). Data source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp 
database. 
PRCSEN Change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio due 
to a 1% increase in the value of the firm’s common stock price. 
Data source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
LPRCSEN Natural logarithm of PRCSEN. 
RATE_DUM Equals one if a firm has an S&P rating on long term debt (Item 
#280), and zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat Annual 
Industrial file. 
RATING Number between 1 and 19 (e.g., 1 for CCC- and 19 for AAA).  
We use the average of Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s ratings. 
If only one agency has an outstanding rating for a particular 
bond, we use that agency’s rating. Data source: Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities Database. 
RD Research and development expenditures (Item #46 or zero if 
missing) scaled by assets (Item #6). Data source: Compustat 
Annual Industrial file. 
REG_DUM Equals one if the firm’s SIC code is between 4900 and 4939 and 
zero otherwise. Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
ROA Ratio of operating income before depreciation (Item #13) to 
total assets (Item #6). Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial 
file. 
ROS Operating income before depreciation (Item #13) scaled by 
sales (Item #12). Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
SGR  Sales growth rate computed as ln(Item #12t/Item #12t-1). Data 
source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
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SPREAD Daily difference between the corporate bond’s daily yield-to 
maturity and the linearly interpolated benchmark Treasury bond 
yield (BENCHMARK_TREAS) as our dependent variable. These 
yields are based on 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20 and 30 year constant 
maturity series. Data source: Yields are from Thomson’s 
Datastream database and Treasury rates are from the FRED at 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
STD_RET Monthly stock return standard deviation during the fiscal year 
multiplied by the ratio of the market value of equity  (Item #199 
* Item #54) to the market value of assets (Item #199 * Item #54 
+ Item #6 – Item #60). Data source: Monthly returns are from 
CRSP monthly file and financial accounting information is from 
Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
STOCKRET  Buy-and-hold return during the fiscal year. Data source: CRSP 
monthly file. 
ST3 Debt in current liabilities (Item #34) plus debt maturing in the 
second year (Item #91) plus debt maturing in the third year 
(Item #92), scaled by total debt. Total debt is defined as debt in 
current liabilities (Iten#34) plus long-term debt (Item #9). Data 
source: Compustat Annual Industrial file.  
ST5 Debt in current liabilities (Item #34) plus debt maturing in the 
second (Item #91), third (Item #92), fourth (Item #93), and fifth 
years (Item #94), all scaled by total debt as defined above. Data 
source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
SURCASH  Cash from assets-in-place (Item #308 – Item #125 + Item #46) 
scaled by assets (Item #6). Data source: Compustat Annual 
Industrial file. 
TERM Yield on 10-year government bonds subtracted from the yield 
on six-month government bonds at the fiscal yearend. Data 
source: FRED at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
VOLSEN Change in the value of the CEO’s option portfolio due to a 1% 
change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. 
Data source: Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
LVOLSEN Natural logarithm of VOLSEN. 
YLDCRV_SLOPE Difference between 10-year and two-year Treasury rates. Data 
source: FRED at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
ZSCORE_DUM Equals one if Altman’s Z-score is greater than 1.81, and zero 
otherwise. Altman’s Z-score is computed as 3.3*Item #178/Item 
#6 + 1.2*(Item #4-Item #5)/Item #6 + Item #12 /Item# 6 + 
0.6*Item #199*Item #25 / (Item #9+Item #34) + 1.4*Item 
#36/Item #6. Data source: Compustat Annual Industrial file. 
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Table I 
Sample Distribution 
This table shows the time series (Panel A) and industrial (Panel B) distribution of the proportion of short-term debt and the price 
sensitivities of the CEO’s option portfolio. The sample contains 6,825 observations and covers the 1992 to 2005 period. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
Panel A: Medians by fiscal year 
Year N ST3 ST5 PRCSEN VOLSEN LEVERAGE 
1992 135 0.309 0.466 1.111 0.109 0.113 
1993 398 0.320 0.489 1.044 0.141 0.131 
1994 516 0.347 0.549 0.991 0.127 0.141 
1995 533 0.303 0.547 1.183 0.190 0.136 
1996 557 0.287 0.557 1.491 0.217 0.130 
1997 559 0.292 0.568 1.870 0.285 0.120 
1998 489 0.306 0.574 1.690 0.417 0.135 
1999 463 0.358 0.593 1.906 0.447 0.136 
2000 469 0.432 0.666 2.076 0.547 0.119 
2001 481 0.354 0.604 2.610 0.709 0.137 
2002 542 0.315 0.548 2.043 0.802 0.156 
2003 566 0.307 0.541 2.758 0.871 0.143 
2004 598 0.317 0.547 3.061 0.837 0.124 
2005 519 0.285 0.522 2.960 0.748 0.113 
Panel B: Medians by industry 
Industry 
2-
digit 
SIC 
N ST3 ST5 PRCSEN VOLSEN 
Food and kindred products 20 258 0.335 0.553 4.239 0.432 
Tobacco products 21 5 0.339 0.541 2.496 1.253 
Textile mill products 22 69 0.316 0.588 1.031 0.107 
Apparel and products made from fabrics 23 93 0.512 0.701 1.603 0.208 
Lumber and wood products 24 52 0.249 0.429 3.271 0.589 
Furniture and fixtures 25 74 0.276 0.568 2.418 0.525 
Paper and allied products 26 192 0.285 0.464 1.374 0.436 
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 27 214 0.322 0.648 2.618 0.564 
Chemicals and allied products 28 731 0.381 0.659 2.805 0.628 
Petroleum refining and related industries 29 100 0.228 0.393 4.151 1.121 
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 30 100 0.354 0.656 1.932 0.280 
Leather and leather products 31 38 0.526 0.887 0.407 0.117 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 32 53 0.248 0.659 1.266 0.223 
Primary metal industries 33 197 0.245 0.524 0.984 0.238 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 172 0.352 0.616 1.259 0.306 
Machinery and computer equipment 35 562 0.440 0.706 1.809 0.478 
Electronic and other electrical equipment 36 565 0.396 0.742 2.260 0.421 
Transportation equipment 37 227 0.340 0.529 1.946 0.408 
Measuring, analyzing, and controlling instruments 38 478 0.449 0.850 2.996 0.515 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 73 0.418 0.634 3.647 0.564 
Railroad transportation 40 40 0.170 0.335 4.972 1.953 
Highway passenger transportation 41 6 0.179 0.977 0.614 0.172 
Motor freight transportation and warehousing 42 74 0.411 0.756 2.845 0.172 
Water transportation 44 36 0.169 0.415 1.229 0.557 
Transportation by air 45 96 0.264 0.426 1.542 0.409 
40 
Transportation services 47 21 0.590 1.000 14.130 0.439 
Continued from Table I       
Communications 48 190 0.272 0.415 3.604 1.134 
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 49 883 0.256 0.372 0.436 0.151 
Wholesale trade-durable goods 50 237 0.342 0.672 1.511 0.325 
Wholesale trade-non-durable goods 51 115 0.349 0.530 1.522 0.363 
Building materials and hardware 52 41 0.158 0.785 7.522 0.155 
General merchandise stores 53 147 0.262 0.453 5.351 0.844 
Food stores 54 78 0.254 0.526 1.624 0.328 
Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 55 60 0.595 0.836 2.993 0.224 
Apparel and accessory stores 56 149 0.309 0.538 2.199 0.412 
Home furniture and furnishings 57 80 0.396 0.619 3.166 0.775 
Eating and drinking places 58 161 0.366 0.714 1.939 0.342 
Miscellaneous retail 59 158 0.389 0.629 3.144 0.556 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for our dependent and right-hand-side variables in the maturity regression. The sample 
contains 6,825 observations and covers the 1992 to 2005 period. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
ST3 0.398 0.308 0.000 0.157 0.321 0.589 1.000 
ST5 0.583 0.306 0.000 0.347 0.560 0.888 1.000 
PRCSEN 6.914 17.160 0.017 0.689 1.894 5.487 132.340 
VOLSEN 1.108 1.913 0.000 0.112 0.408 1.158 11.446 
SIZE 10182.7 26408.9 25.095 916.6 2414.1 7632.2 449110.2 
LEVERAGE 0.154 0.124 0.000 0.052 0.132 0.236 0.522 
ASSET_MAT 11.619 10.280 0.769 4.395 7.846 15.394 45.425 
OWN 0.024 0.057 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.014 0.328 
M/B 1.888 1.146 0.803 1.193 1.508 2.133 7.593 
TERM 1.535 1.137 -0.440 0.570 1.360 2.550 3.550 
REG_DUM 0.114 0.317 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ABNEARN 0.006 0.100 -0.432 -0.012 0.006 0.023 0.512 
STD_RET 0.064 0.046 0.011 0.034 0.051 0.080 0.260 
RATE_DUM 0.604 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ZSCORE_DUM 0.861 0.346 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table III 
Average Corporate Bond Yield Spreads and Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for the bond pricing sample. The sample contains 268,400 day-bond observations based 
on the 1994 to 2005 period. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
Panel A: Average corporate bond yield spread (%) broken down by maturity 
Maturity AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC 
Short (1- 7 years) 0.359 0.533 0.644 1.016 2.923 2.826 5.671 
Medium (7-15 years) 0.534 0.730 1.006 1.546 3.111 4.483 7.212 
Long  (15-30 years) 0.612 0.829 1.125 1.725 3.258 4.810 8.659 
Panel B: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% Max 
SPREAD 1.640 1.750 0.312 0.465 0.783 1.086 1.688 4.720 11.651 
MAT 14.682 7.385 2.386 3.814 7.718 15.211 21.182 25.959 28.116 
LMAT 2.520 0.627 0.870 1.339 2.044 2.722 3.053 3.257 3.336 
LPRCSEN 1.998 0.933 0.251 0.608 1.315 1.843 2.672 3.499 4.966 
LVOLSEN 1.343 0.707 0.000 0.253 0.862 1.298 1.824 2.521 3.141 
STD_RET 1.822 0.815 0.765 0.918 1.255 1.595 2.200 3.302 5.572 
AVG_RET 0.060 0.150 -0.396 -0.184 -0.027 0.058 0.145 0.309 0.512 
RATING 12.431 3.328 2.000 5.500 11.000 14.000 14.000 17.000 19.000 
ROS 0.155 0.087 -0.024 0.046 0.096 0.136 0.202 0.317 0.422 
LEVERAGE 0.189 0.111 0.012 0.045 0.105 0.166 0.264 0.406 0.477 
INTCOVERAGE 1.895 0.706 0.000 0.745 1.463 1.843 2.294 3.055 3.850 
COUPON 7.666 1.321 3.800 5.400 6.875 7.625 8.750 9.700 10.200 
ILLIQUIDITY 0.161 0.258 0.023 0.031 0.039 0.047 0.070 0.844 1.000 
ISSUE_SIZE 5.335 0.628 3.219 4.605 5.011 5.298 5.704 6.215 6.908 
BENCHMARK_TREAS 4.727 0.816 2.873 3.325 4.250 4.732 5.149 6.260 7.010 
YLDCRV_SLOPE 1.208 0.965 -0.260 -0.090 0.190 1.310 2.160 2.480 2.640 
EURO_TREAS_SPREAD 0.219 0.138 0.030 0.060 0.110 0.180 0.310 0.490 0.700 
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Table IV 
Relation between Debt Maturity and CEO Portfolio Price/Volatility Sensitivities 
This table shows the pooled regression results for two specifications. In the first (second) specification, the dependent variable is 
ST3 (ST5). The sample contains 6,825 observations and covers the 1992 to 2005 period. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Statistical significance is based on Rogers (1993) industry-year clustered standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent variables 
ST3  ST5 
Independent 
variables Predicted signs 
Coefficient estimate p-value  Coefficient estimate p-value 
Intercept  1.4281*** 0.000  1.2059*** 0.000 
LPRCSEN - -0.0385*** 0.000  -0.0179** 0.012 
LVOLSEN + 0.0309*** 0.001  0.0277*** 0.003 
LSIZE - -0.1558*** 0.000  -0.0777*** 0.000 
LSIZE2 + 0.0090*** 0.000  0.0041*** 0.001 
LEVERAGE - -1.1068*** 0.000  -0.6251*** 0.000 
ASSET_MAT - -0.0026*** 0.000  -0.0036*** 0.000 
OWN + 0.4562*** 0.000  0.1567* 0.093 
M/B + -0.0021 0.714  -0.0044 0.382 
TERM - 0.0014 0.699  -0.0049 0.209 
REG_DUM - 0.0108 0.429  -0.0501*** 0.001 
ABNEARN + -0.0171 0.648  0.0253 0.500 
STD_RET + 0.0163 0.889  0.2232** 0.036 
RATE_DUM - -0.0945*** 0.000  -0.1413*** 0.000 
ZSCORE_DUM - -0.1194*** 0.000  -0.047*** 0.000 
R2adj  0.251  0.226 
N  6,825  6,825 
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Table V 
Relation between Debt Maturity and CEO Portfolio Price/Volatility Sensitivities, 
Joint Determination of Maturity and Leverage 
This table shows results for the two-equation system allowing joint determination of maturity and leverage based on GMM. The 
sample contains 6,825 observations and covers the 1992 to 2005 period. For brevity, only the debt maturity equation estimations 
are reported. Debt maturity is measured as ST3 and ST5. All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables 
ST3  ST5 Independent variables Predicted signs 
Coefficient estimate p-value  Coefficient estimate p-value 
Intercept  -0.8225 0.596  -2.5835 0.156 
LPRCSEN - -0.0829*** 0.000  -0.0698*** 0.004 
LVOLSEN + 0.0984** 0.014  0.1269*** 0.009 
LSIZE - 0.4047 0.267  0.8355* 0.051 
LSIZE2 + -0.0246 0.258  -0.0505** 0.049 
LEVERAGE - -1.2759*** 0.000  -0.3228 0.421 
ASSET_MAT - -0.0016*** 0.001  -0.0026*** 0.000 
OWN + 1.0197*** 0.000  0.7855*** 0.008 
M/B + -0.0037 0.796  0.0113 0.486 
TERM - -0.0002 0.966  -0.0058* 0.094 
REG_DUM - -0.0035 0.855  -0.0982*** 0.000 
ABNEARN + 0.0146 0.707  0.0526 0.193 
STD_RET + 0.0853 0.765  0.5645* 0.085 
RATE_DUM - -0.1165*** 0.008  -0.2245*** 0.000 
ZSCORE_DUM - -0.0807* 0.077  0.0185 0.736 
R2adj  0.182  0.204 
N  6,825  6,825 
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Table VI 
Relation between Debt Maturity and CEO Portfolio Price/Volatility Sensitivities, 
Change Regressions 
This table shows the results of the change regressions. Δ is used as a prefix to denote the change. In the first (second) 
specification, the dependent variable is the change in ST3 (ST5). The sample contains 5,513 observations and covers the 1993 to 
2005 period. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Statistical significance is based on Rogers (1993) year clustered standard 
errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variables 
ΔST3  ΔST5 Independent variables Predicted signs 
Coefficient estimate p-value  Coefficient estimate p-value 
Intercept  0.0058* 0.093  0.0014 0.530 
ΔLPRCSEN - -0.0440*** 0.003  -0.0259** 0.025 
ΔLVOLSEN + 0.0483** 0.012  0.0247* 0.090 
ΔLSIZE - -0.0831 0.176  0.0647 0.291 
ΔLSIZE2 + 0.0018 0.650  -0.0029 0.475 
ΔLEVERAGE - -1.1325*** 0.000  -0.6638*** 0.000 
ΔASSET_MAT - -0.0007 0.449  -0.0005 0.614 
ΔOWN + 0.7247*** 0.007  0.5065** 0.015 
ΔM/B + -0.0009 0.940  -0.0289** 0.017 
ΔTERM - -0.0040 0.339  -0.0073** 0.020 
ΔABNEARN + -0.0226 0.377  0.0553** 0.026 
ΔSTD_RET + 0.0376 0.798  0.1341 0.302 
ΔRATE_DUM - -0.1201*** 0.000  -0.1929*** 0.000 
ΔZSCORE_DUM - -0.1242*** 0.000  -0.0571*** 0.000 
R2adj   0.095  0.063 
N   5,513  5,513 
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Table VII 
Relation between Debt Maturity and CEO Portfolio Price/Volatility Sensitivities, 
Joint Determination of Maturity, Leverage, Compensation, and Investment 
This table examines the robustness of the relation between debt maturity and managerial incentives by allowing for the joint 
determination of maturity, compensation, capital structure, and investment policies based on GMM. The sample contains 6,180 
firm-year observations. All variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
